In 1996 the technologies for acquiring insensitive munitions (IM) exist in countries which have engaged in significant research in this field since 1970-1980. France, one of them, is therefore faced now with the problem of implementing IM, which can be summed up as follows:

all of which must be done in a context of tight budget constraints.

As part of its objective to promote the concept of insensitive munitions, Club MURAT, jointly with the French MOD, has undertaken a number of initiatives [1 & 2] designed to help formulate elements capable of resolving this problem. These initiatives include:

This question reflects in concrete fashion the concern of the armed forces which, as well as a reduction of potential losses from hazards in wartime, want to see an easing of logistical constraints, especially in respect of munition storage.

Club MURAT, which groups the Aerospatiale Missiles Div., Giat Industries, Matra Défense, SNPE and TDA in this particular sphere, makes proposals on this issue.

Standardization in the realm of IM has made significant strides recently, notably following:

In the table 1 hereafter, the reaction levels accepted in these two documents are compared with those accepted under MIL-STD-2105B ('Hazard Assessment Tests For Non-Nuclear Munitions - 12.01.94').

An examination of these requirements clearly reveals a significant limitation of the response to accidental stimuli with a MURAT munition. If the analysis is confined to possible stimuli in peacetime or in times of crisis, it emerges that:

The principal statutory texts for explosive regulations, as applied by the French armed forces, are the following:

These texts draw extensive inspiration from two source documents:

Under these rules, munitions for military use are divided on the one hand, into hazard divisions and on the other hand into compatibility groups.

This leads to classification of munitions based on hazard division/compatibility group couplings (eg. 1.3C). In the application of these rules,

Most munitions in service, whether warheads or all-up rounds, come under one of the following three classifications:

An initial analysis would therefore suggest that an easing of logistical constraints must entail changes in hazard division, a priori in the following order:

Transition to IM primarily concern munitions presently assigned to 1.1 or 1.2 Hazard Divisions.

IM are munitions which, of course, no longer come under hazard division 1.1 but are still mainly 1.2 types, according to present rules.

Unfortunately, as the previous isolation-distance table showed, the safety distances stipulated for 1.2 are often the same as those for 1.1 coupled with a projections hazard, when the weight is less than about 5000kg. Thus, little benefit is accorded to IM in this weight range, which are in fact frequently encountered in the French Air Force.

Furthermore, when a munition is already assigned to 1.2 HD before IM processing, there is strictly no benefit accruing, irrespective of weight or configuration.

This situation could lead users to become less open to transition to IM, particularly if this transition is perceived as being no more than evolving from 1.1 to1.2 HD.

And yet MURAT* or IM stand out clearly among 1.2 munitions, especially in respect of reaction to fire:

Such reactions warrant applying to MURAT* and IM isolation rules intermediate between those for hazard division 1.2 and those of hazard division 1.3.

Three ways are conceivable today:

This solutions is quite legal and authorized in French Q-D rules (which are almost the same for companies and forces).

Even if it is used by French companies on workshops dedicated to a specific product, this solution is not adapted to multiproducts military compounds.

Way A, a short-term way, seems to be a dead-end for military compounds.

It would be a subdivision of 1.2 HD, Q-D of which should be intermediate between those of 1.2 HD, which are designed for the most hazardous 1.2, detonating in a fire, and those of 1.3 HD.

It is worth noting that in this situation, US DOD took an initiative. It has, in some way, made official the light projection hazard of IM, by creating a special subdivision, unit risk 1.2 HD, with isolation distances intermediate between 1.2 Q-D and 1.3 Q-D.

It is also worth noting that NATO is presently exploring projections hazard of 1.2 items, through a testing campaign performed in different countries [Ref: 7,8,9].

It would be interesting that IM be included in this campaign.